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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal of the denial of a tax credit under the 
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act, Pub. L. 96-223, 94 Stat. 
229 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 19, 26, and 
42 U.S.C.) (repealed in part 1988) ("COWPTA") which grants 
oil producers an income tax credit of $3.00 for each barrel- 
of-oil equivalent of "oil produced from . . . tar sands" 
extracted through wells drilled between January 1, 1980 
and December 31, 1992. The resolution of this case turns 
on the proper definition of "oil produced from tar sands," 
which the Act does not define. Shell contends the definition 
should be derived from commonly accepted usage in the 
petroleum industry and asserts that when the statute was 
enacted in 1980, "tar sand oil" meant "oil so viscous[1] that 
it cannot be recovered economically through `primary 
production methods'[2]-- i.e., methods used in ordinary oil 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "Viscosity is the measure of a fluid's resistance to flow. In an oil 
reservoir, viscosity is the measure of the oil's resistance to movement 
through the reservoir rock to the well-bore. Given uniform pressure and 
rock properties, a more viscous oil will move through the reservoir more 
slowly than a less viscous oil." Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 
996 
F. Supp. 361, 362 n.1 (D. Del. 1997). 
 
2. Crude oil is ordinarily extracted through wells from underground 
reservoirs, which are formations of sand or rock containing tiny pore 
spaces permeated with oil. There are three types of production through 
wells: Primary production depends on the inherent pressure in an oil 
reservoir. Secondary production involves the injection of gas or water 
into a reservoir to increase pressure. Tertiary (or enhanced) production, 
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fields." The government maintains the proper definition may 
be found in Department of Energy Ruling 1976-4, which 
defines "tar sands" as "[t]he several rock types that contain 
an extremely viscous hydrocarbon which is not recoverable 
in its natural state by conventional oil well production 
methods including currently used enhanced recovery 
techniques." Department of Energy Ruling 1976-4, 10 
C.F.R. ch. II Rulings 371, 372 (1980).3  Shell concedes that 
it is not entitled to a refund if we accept the DOE Ruling 
definition. Following a bench trial, the District Court 
adopted the definition of tar sands crafted by the DOE 
Ruling and denied the refund. See Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. 
United States, 996 F. Supp. 361, 372 (D. Del. 1997). 
Because we substantially agree with the District Court's 






Beginning in 1973, world oil prices quadrupled in less 
than a year after the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries embargoed oil sales to Western nations and then 
fixed prices above market levels. See Gary D. Allison, 
Energy Sectionalism: Economic Origins and Legal 
Responses, 38 Sw. L.J. 703, 705 (1984). Congress 
responded with the 1973 Emergency Petroleum Allocation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
such as the injection of steam into the reservoir, increases its 
temperature (making the oil less viscous) or alters its other 
characteristics. Shell's definition classifies oil recoverable only by 
means 
of secondary or enhanced/tertiary production methods as tar sand oil. 
 
In the petroleum industry, crude oil is commonly designated as "light," 
"medium," or "heavy," depending on its density; heavier oils are generally 
more viscous. Primary production is effective with lighter, lower-
viscosity 
oil, but more viscous oils require secondary or enhanced production 
methods. 
 
3. The Ruling was initially issued by one of DOE's predecessor agencies, 
the Federal Energy Agency. By the time COWPTA was enacted, the 
Ruling had been redesignated a DOE Ruling in the Code of Federal 
Regulations." 
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Act (EPAA), Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 751-760h) (expired 
1981), authorizing the President to regulate prices and 
allocate supplies of crude oil and related petroleum 
products. 
 
In 1976, the Federal Energy Agency, which administered 
EPAA, issued Ruling 1976-4 in response to "inquiries with 
respect to the applicability of the [EPAA price and supply 
controls] to the so-called synthetic fuels (or crude oil 
substitutes) processed from oil shale, tar sands, coal, and 
other natural deposits that must be mined[4] before the 
crude oil substitute can be extracted." Department of 
Energy Ruling 1976-4, 10 C.F.R. ch. II Rulings at 371. 
According to FEA, 
 
       at the time of enactment of the EPAA, domestic 
       production of crude oil substitutes derived from oil 
       shale, coal and tar sands was, as it is now, undertaken 
       only for experimental purposes, and the synthetic 
       products obtained thereby were not commercially 
       available for use as refinery or petro-chemical 
       feedstocks and were not expected to become 
       commercially available for several years. 
 
Id. at 372. Therefore, FEA concluded that synthetic fuels 
processed from tar sands were not subject to the EPAA 
regulatory scheme. See id. at 373. 
 
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act proved 
counterproductive. Price controls reduced incentives to 
produce oil domestically and increased domestic oil 
consumption overall, making America more dependent on 
expensive imported oil. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United 
States Dep't of Energy, 655 F.2d 1118, 1121 (Temp. Emer. 
Ct. App. 1981). Oil prices fell in real terms after 1975, but 
world oil prices doubled in 1979, when the Iranian 
revolution severely curtailed oil exports. See Allison, supra, 
at 705-06. The Carter administration announced in 1979 it 
would phase out price controls, dramatically increasing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Tar sand oil can be produced by mining the tar sand and 
subsequently separating the oil from the mined rock through physical 
and chemical processes. 
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domestic producers' short-term profits. See H.R. No. 96- 
304, at 5-7 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 587, 
592-94. For this reason, Congress responded to the price 
decontrols with the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act. Title 
I ("Windfall Profit Tax on Domestic Crude Oil") imposed an 
excise tax on revenue from producer sales of crude oil, 
designed to capture the windfall profit. See  26 U.S.C. 
SS 4986-98 (1982) (repealed 1988). To avoid suppressing 
the domestic oil supply, new production and other 
production considered sensitive to price fluctuations were 
taxed at lower rates or exempted. See id.SS 4987(b), 4991- 
93; S. Rep. No. 96-394, at 2 (1979), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 410, 414. More importantly for our purposes, 
Title II ("Energy Conservation and Production Incentives") 
sought to reduce American dependence on imported oil by 
various means, including a tax credit "for producing fuel 
from a nonconventional source." 26 U.S.C.A. S 29 (West 
Supp. 1999) (as amended 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1988, 
1990, 1992, and 1996) (originally designated S 44D).5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Credit for producing fuel from a nonconventional source 
 
       (a) Allowance of credit.--There shall be allowed as a credit 
against 
       the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount 
       equal to-- 
 
       (1) $3, multiplied by 
 
       (2) the barrel-of-oil equivalent of qualified fuels-- 
 
        (A) sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the 
       taxable year, and 
 
        (B) the production of which is attributable to the taxpayer. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (c) Definition of qualified fuels.--For purposes of this section-- 
 
       (1) In general.--The term "qualified fuels" means-- 
 
        (A) Oil produced from shale and tar sands 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (f) Application of section.--This section shall apply with respect 
to 
       qualified fuels-- 
 
       (1) which are-- 
         (A) produced from a well drilled after December 31, 1979, and 
       before January 1, 1993 
 
26 U.S.C.A. S 29. 
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Among the fuels qualified to receive the credit was "oil 
produced from shale and tar sands" through wells drilled 
between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1992. Id. 




In 1983 and 1984, the tax years in question, Shell 
Petroleum, Inc. and certain subsidiary corporations owned 
working interests in properties in the Midway Sunset Field, 
Kern County, California. Part of the Midway Sunset Field 
lies over a reservoir known as "the Potter Sand formation" 
or "Potter Sands." For over a decade Shell had been 
extracting oil from Potter Sands through two steam 
injection techniques (steam soak, begun in 1963, and 
steam flood, begun in 1971). By 1980, both were well 
established and widely accepted enhanced recovery 
techniques in the petroleum industry.6  
 
In its 1983 and 1984 tax returns, Shell did not seek the 
nonconventional source tax credit for Potter Sands oil, but 
in 1991 Shell filed amended tax returns claiming credits of 
$5,351,150 for Potter Sands oil produced during 1983 and 
1984 from wells drilled after December 31, 1979. The tax 
credits were denied and Shell timely filed suit. Relying in 
part on the "instructive" analysis of Texaco Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 571 (1993),7  the District Court, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The record does not disclose whether any oil was produced from Potter 
Sands during 1983 and 1984 other than through steam injection, but 
Shell does not claim to have used any technology that was not well 
established in 1980. 
 
7. Texaco argued certain high-viscosity crude oil it had produced was tar 
sand oil. The Tax Court accepted that when COWPTA was enacted "tar 
sand oil" was "generally understood" within the petroleum industry as oil 
that "could not be economically produced through a well using only 
primary recovery methods," see Texaco, 101 T.C. at 575-76, but rejected 
that definition for two reasons. First, Congress sought to subsidize 
"alternative energy sources [that] typically involve new technologies." S. 
Rep. No. 96-394, at 87, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 496. Crude oil 
produced with technology widely available when the credit was enacted, 
the Texaco court reasoned, was not such an energy source. See Texaco, 
101 T.C. at 576-77. Second, Title I defined oil produced using tertiary 
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noted, entered judgment for the United States. See Shell, 
996 F. Supp. at 371. Shell now appeals.8  
 
As we will discuss, Title I of COWPTA establishes that 
Shell's Potter Sands oil is crude oil. But the structure of the 
statute and the legislative history establish that crude oil is 
not tar sand oil. Therefore, Shell's oil cannot be tar sand 
oil. Furthermore, the legislative history establishes that the 
nonconventional source tax credit was intended to foster 
new energy technologies, whereas Shell's Potter Sands oil 
was produced in 1983 and 1984 using widely available 




" `Where . . . resolution of a question of federal law turns 
on a statute and the intention of Congress, we lookfirst to 
the statutory language and then to the legislative history if 
the statutory language is unclear.' " Murphy v. Dalton, 81 
F.3d 343, 350 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 
U.S. 886, 896 (1984)). As noted, COWPTA does not define 
"oil produced from tar sands," but "where Congress has 
used technical words or terms of art, it is proper to explain 
them by reference to the art or science to which they are 
appropriate." Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 
188, 201 (1974) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
production methods available in 1980 as crude oil subject to the windfall 
profit tax. But the discussion of Title I in the legislative record 
indicated 
that Congress considered "oil produced from tar sands" to be synthetic 
petroleum, which Congress distinguished from crude oil. Therefore, the 
Tax Court concluded that oil producible using tertiary recovery methods 
could not be tar sand oil unless Congress had intended to give different 
meetings to the term "oil produced from tar sands" as used in the text 
of Title II and in the Title I Committee Reports, an unlikely scenario. 
See 
id. at 579-80. 
 
8. The District Court had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. 
S 1346(a)(1) (West 1993). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C.A. S 1291 (West 1993). Questions of statutory interpretation are 
reviewed de novo. See United States v. West Indies Transport, Inc., 127 
F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 1997). Findings of fact made following a bench 
trial are reviewed for clear error. See Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 
1049 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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omitted). We ordinarily look to the meaning of a statutory 
term at the time the statute was adopted. See MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
228 (1994) (explaining that "the most relevant time for 
determining a statutory term's meaning" is the time when 
the statute became law); see also McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. 
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (interpreting statute as 
of the date of its passage); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 
37, 42 (1979) (same). In this case, the District Court did 
not rely on the industry understanding of "tar sand oil," in 
part because "[t]he testimony offered at trial suggests that, 
in fact, there was no industry consensus regarding a 
definition of tar sands in 1980 when Section 29 was 
enacted." Shell, 996 F. Supp. at 369. 9 Shell contests the 
court's factual finding and argues that, even in the absence 
of an industry consensus, the court should have limited 
itself to selecting among definitions that were acceptable to 




Contending the District Court misunderstood its theory 
of the case, Shell contests the court's finding there was no 
consensus definition of "tar sand oil" in 1980. The District 
Court described Shell's definition of tar sand oil as 
 
       [a]ny consolidated or unconsolidated rock (other than 
       coal, oil shale, or gilsonite) that either: (1) contains a 
       hydrocarbonaceous material with a gas-free viscosity, 
       at original reservoir temperature, greater than 10,000 
       centipoise,[10] or (2) contains a hydrocarbonaceous 
       material and is produced by mining or quarrying. 
 
Shell, 996 F. Supp. at 369. At trial, Shell referred to this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Texaco Court, on a different record, found that "no single 
definition of tar sands was universally recognized" when COWPTA was 
enacted but that the industry "generally understood" the term to refer to 
oil too viscous to be produced economically using only primary 
production techniques. Texaco, 101 T.C. at 573. 
 
10. Within the petroleum industry, viscosity is measured in centipoise 
(cp). The viscosity of water is approximately 1 cp, while that of molasses 
is 7,000 cp. 
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definition as the "viscosity standard" and on appeal calls it 
the "quantitative standard." Shell concedes this standard 
was not generally accepted until 1983 but asserts that, in 
1980, petroleum engineers agreed that "tar sand oil" was oil 
too viscous to be produced using primary production 
methods (the "primary production definition"). Furthermore, 
Shell maintains that petroleum experts in 1980 were able 
to identify tar sand and tar sand oil by inspection. Shell 
calls this experience-based identification of tar sand oil the 
"qualitative standard." According to Shell, the viscosity 
standard was a conservative quantification of the earlier 
primary production and qualitative definitions. 11 Because 
the trial court made no findings with respect to the other 
proposed definitions or their relationships to the viscosity 
standard,12 Shell seeks a remand to determine whether the 
qualitative or the primary production definition was widely 
accepted by the industry in 1980 and whether the Potter 
Sands oil meets those definitions. 
 
But Shell did not properly assert these additional 
industry definitions at trial. In the Pretrial Order, entered 
three days before trial, Shell listed only two "Issues of Law 
Which Remain to Be Litigated": 
 
       (1) Whether the consensus definition of tar sand oil as 
       having a viscosity greater than 10,000 centipoise, 
       measured gas-free, at original reservoir temperature, 
       identifies "oil produced from . . . tar sand" under 26 
       U.S.C. S 29 in 1983 and 1984? 
 
       (2) Whether FEA ruling 1976-4 . . . has any utility in 
       identifying "oil produced from . . . tar sand" under 26 
       U.S.C. S 29? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Texaco court found the quantitative viscosity definition to be 
"consistent with the oil and gas industry's definition of tar sands as of 
April 1980," when COWPTA was enacted. See Texaco, 101 T.C. at 574. 
 
12. The District Court discussed the viscosity standard at length but did 
not mention the qualitative or primary production definitions. The court 
supported its finding that there was no consensus definition in 1980 
with citations to testimony by a Shell expert and to a Shell Proposed 
Finding of Fact, see Shell, 996 F. Supp. at 369, which discussed the lack 
of agreement on a quantitative distinction between tar sand oil and 
heavy oil. 
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Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, No. 93-508, slip op. at 
15 (D. Del. Aug. 24, 1995) (Pretrial Order) (first and third 
ellipsis in original). The pretrial order controls the 
subsequent course of the trial unless modified to prevent 
manifest injustice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e); Hassan v. 
Stafford, 472 F.2d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1973). This order was 
never modified, nor did Shell request a modification. 
Indeed, Shell's opening statement confirmed to the court its 
theory of the case: 
 
       [W]e will provide testimony that will show that the 
       10,000 centipoise definition of tar sand oil was the 
       subject of considerable discussion, considerable 
       thought among industry experts and knowledgeable 
       Government officials prior to 1980 and in the-- 
       throughout the year, the early 1980's. 
 
        And the point is here that, although tar sand experts 
       knew what tar sands were, there was no precise and 
       generally acceptable demarcation between tar sand oil 
       and other heavy oils. 
 
The statement does not advance the theories Shell now 
proposes. 
 
Shell has directed our attention to passages in the 
pretrial order, to passages in briefs submitted to the 
District Court, and to certain testimony elicited without 
objection at trial13 in which it claims it raised its other 
definitions. Generally, pretrial orders are liberally construed 
to permit the parties to advance their cases, see United 
States Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., 668 F.2d 172, 181 
n.12 (3d Cir. 1981), and an issue can be tried by consent 
when testimony relevant to the issue is introduced without 
objection, see Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1236 (3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Many of these passages are themselves not properly before us, 
because Shell has not included them in the appellate record. The 
appellant is required to provide a record to support the claims it makes 
on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b), 11(a); Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., 
Inc., 
54 F.3d 931, 963 (1st Cir. 1995); Schmid v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 
827 F.2d 384, 386 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 
671 (10th Cir. 1984). Based on the excerpts Shell has quoted to us, the 
passages outside the appellate record on which Shell relies are no 
stronger than those in the record. 
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Cir. 1995). But a party still must unequivocally put its 
position before the trial court at a point and in a manner 
that permits the court to consider its merits. See Keenan v. 
City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("[T]he crucial question regarding waiver is whether 
defendants presented the argument with sufficient 
specificity to alert the district court"); Portis v. First Nat'l 
Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The raising party 
must present the issue so that it places the opposing party 
and the court on notice that a new issue is being raised."). 
We believe that Shell did not raise its primary production or 
qualitative definitions in an unequivocal manner. 14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. For instance, Shell noted in the section of the pretrial order 
entitled 
"Statement of What Plaintiffs Expects [sic] to Prove," 
 
       During 1980, the Viscosity Standard became DOE's standard for 
       distinguishing between tar sand oil and other heavy oils. Prior to 
       adoption of the Viscosity Standard in 1980, Defendant's agency 
       DOE, and its predecessor the Bureau of Mines, relied on physical 
       inspection of core and oil samples to identify tar sand. Shell's 
Potter 
       Sands and the oil produced therefrom are tar sands and tar sand 
       oils under the 1980 DOE practices. 
 
In this passage, Shell asserted that DOE, but not the petroleum industry 
as a whole, identified tar sand using Shell's qualitative standard. Shell 
did not claim its Potter Sands oil satisfied the qualitative standard: it 
stated that its oil was tar sand oil according to"the 1980 DOE 
practices," an ambiguous phrase which could have referred either to the 
qualitative standard or to the quantitative viscosity standard, allegedly 
adopted in 1980. But statements made in the same section of the 
pretrial order suggest that Shell was advancing the quantitative standard 
at trial: 
 
       Tar sand is rock containing crude oil with a viscosity exceeding 
       10,000 cp measured gas-free at original reservoir temperature. . . 
. 
 
        The consensus of industry and the United States government in 
       1980 was that an agreed terminology for tar sands oil to adequately 
       distinguish it from other heavy oils was needed. . .. 
 
Here, Shell explicitly urges the quantitative standard on the court and 
acknowledges that the standards in use in 1980 were unacceptable to 
the consensus of petroleum experts. Even a liberal interpretation of this 
language will not embrace the position Shell takes on appeal. 
 
Shell was more explicit in its post-trial proposedfindings of fact and 
conclusions of law, stating, e.g., "The degree of viscosity of tar sand 
oil 
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We have frequently noted "the well-established rule that 
absent compelling circumstances an appellate court will not 
consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." 
Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1984).15 
"This general rule applies with added force where the timely 
raising of the issue would have permitted the parties to 
develop a factual record," because we cannot know on 
appeal what evidence the adverse party would have 
presented or brought out through cross-examination. 
Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finding no 
"compelling circumstances" requiring consideration of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
was commonly expressed as oil that could not be commercially produced 
through a well using primary recovery methods." Post-trial briefs are not 
generally appropriate places to raise one's theory of the case. In any 
event, this brief also fails to assert Shell's position clearly. The 
sentence 
just quoted was followed by an assertion that the industry shared "[a] 
common understanding that the line of demarcation at which tar sand 
oil became more viscous than heavy oil needed to be established 
quantitatively" and was contained in a section entitled, "The Court may 
consider the industry and government expert development of the 10,000 
cp viscosity distinction between tar sand and other heavy oils in applying 
the earlier enacted 26 U.S.C. S 29 for `oil produced from . . . tar 
sands'." 
Considering the post-trial findings of fact and conclusions of law in its 
entirety, we conclude Shell continued to assert the viscosity standard 
after trial. 
 
As discussed infra, the testimony on which Shell relies could not 
support the factual findings Shell proposes to seek on remand. 
Furthermore, Shell explained to the District Court that the viscosity 
standard emerged in 1983 out of ongoing industry discussion. The 
evidence introduced regarding the pre-1983 standards was consistent 
with this background information regarding the development of the 
quantitative viscosity standard. Hence, neither the government nor the 
court had reason to believe Shell was raising a new theory of the case. 
See Douglas, 50 F.3d at 1236 ("[A]n issue has not been tried by implied 
consent if evidence relevant to the new claim is also relevant to the 
claim 
originally pled, because the defendant does not have any notice that the 
implied claim was being tried."). 
 
15. Furthermore, to promote orderly trial procedures, appellate courts 
are sensitive to the importance of respecting the pretrial order on 
appeal. 
See Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1195 (1st Cir. 
1995). 
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Shell's theories, we decline to exercise our discretion to do 
so. See American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., 729 F.2d 943, 
949-50 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
Furthermore, our review of those portions of the record 
Shell has brought to our attention leads us to conclude 
that the possibility the District Court would find the facts 
as Shell describes them is remote. The strongest evidence 
Shell has cited comes from a report by its expert, Dr. 
Khalid Aziz, who wrote, 
 
       Typically described [prior to 1980] as `extremely 
       viscous,' the tar sand oil was further depicted as oil 
       that could not be produced commercially on primary 
       production. The literature most commonly describes 
       `tar sand' as a naturally occurring rock formation 
       containing a hydrocarbon so viscous that it cannot be 
       economically produced through wells using only 
       primary recovery methods. 
 
But Dr. Aziz testified at trial, 
 
       [P]rior to 1980, I did not see that there was a 
       consensus in the industry as far as a precise definition 
       of tar sand was concerned . . . . 
 
        But by 1980 a consensus did start to build--did not 
       reach a consensus point, but did start to build around 
       the use of 10,000 centipoise. . . . 
 
        In 1983, the definition of tar sands oil was well- 
       established as the viscosity base definition that we 
       have been talking about, viscosity of greater than 
       10,000 centipoise at reservoir conditions on a gas-free 
       basis. . . . 
 
        . . . . 
 
        [Before 1980, e]veryone knew that oils from tar sands 
       were highly viscous. And I think people simply looked 
       at the extreme and--looked at them as highly viscous, 
       but they didn't know where to draw the line between 
       tar sand oils and heavy oils. . . . 
 
Dr. Aziz also confirmed at trial the accuracy of a statement 
he had written in his report: "In 1980 the phrase`oil 
produced from tar sands' was commonly understood to 
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mean all crude oil more viscous than heavy oil. However, 
there was no universally-accepted precise distinction 
between heavy oil and tar sand oil." 
 
Similarly, Shell has called our attention to this testimony 
of a former DOE petroleum engineer: 
 
       The general description that [DOE] used of tar sand [in 
       1979/1980] . . . was any rock containing a very 
       viscous oil. And you could expand on that. In many 
       cases we said it was too viscous to flow through the 
       reservoir or to the well bore, or too viscous to be 
       produced by primary recovery methods, for instance. 
 
The witness was also asked how he identified tar sand 
when he first began working with it in 1970 and replied, "I 
looked at it and I knew it was tar sand." But on cross- 
examination, the witness agreed that "in the industry, as of 
April of 1980, there was no consensus definition of [sic] 
distinguishing heavy oil from tar sand oil." Because Shell's 
own experts testified there was no consensus definition of 
tar sand oil in 1980, it is unlikely Shell could prevail on 
remand. Where the possibility of a different outcome is 
remote, remand for consideration of factual issues not 
raised at trial is inappropriate. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 




Assuming no definition was universally accepted in the 
petroleum industry in 1980, Shell insists the District Court 
should have limited itself to selecting one of the definitions 
used by petroleum engineers at that time. In that regard, 
Shell argues the congressional record should have been 
consulted only for that limited purpose. 
 
Reliance on expert definitions of terms of art is a sound 
"general rule of construction," Massachusetts v. Blackstone 
Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 986 (1st Cir. 1995), but Shell 
has cited no authority supporting the proposition that, 
where no definition of a term of art is broadly accepted in 
the relevant technical field, a court is permitted only to 
choose among rival expert definitions. Where technical 
experts differ in their use of a term, the presumption that 
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Congress has adopted an industry definition grows weaker 
and the courts will rely more heavily on other tools to 
ascertain Congress's meaning. Thus, in Atlantic Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, ___, 118 S.Ct. 
1413 (1998), aff'g 111 F.3d 1056 (3d Cir. 1997), the 
Supreme Court considered a property and casualty 
insurer's challenge to the IRS's administrative 
interpretation of "reserve strengthening" as used in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 S 1023(e)(3)(B), reprinted in note 
following 26 U.S.C.A. S 846 (West 1988). After concluding, 
based on a review of the expert testimony at trial, that the 
term had no established meaning in the field of property 
and casualty insurance, the Court accorded Chevron 
deference to the agency regulation without further reference 
to insurance industry usage. See Atlantic Mutual, 118 S.Ct 
at 1417 18. Here, there is no agency interpretation to defer 
to, but we rely on traditional tools of statutory 




We believe the definition of "tar sand oil" in DOE Ruling 
1976-4 is the one most compatible with congressional 
intent. As noted, Title I of COWPTA defines oil produced 
using enhanced extraction techniques as crude oil. Shell's 
definition, on the other hand, would categorize oil produced 
using enhanced extraction techniques as tar sand oil. 
Congress clearly distinguished tar sand oil from crude oil 
and considered tar sand oil a crude oil substitute. Because 
oil produced using enhanced extraction techniques, such 
as Shell's Potter Sands oil, is not a crude oil substitute, it 
could not qualify for the nonconventional source tax credit. 
Furthermore, Shell's definition would categorize crude oil 
produced with technologies widely available when COWPTA 
was enacted as tar sand oil. But Congress enacted the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. We note that in appropriate cases the Supreme Court has looked to 
the legislative record to confirm that Congress intended to adopt the 
technical definition of a term of art, see Louisiana Publ. Serv. Comm'n v. 
FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 371-73 (1986); Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 
198-201, or has declined to accept a trade definition that conflicted with 
the legislative history, see Idaho Metal Works v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 
199-205 (1966). 
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nonconventional source credit to encourage the 





As noted, Shell's Potter Sands oil was produced through 
steam injection, an enhanced (or tertiary) recovery method. 
As the District Court's reading of the statute demonstrated, 
oil produced using tertiary recovery methods (which the 
statute calls "tertiary oil"), is crude oil subject to the 
windfall profit tax imposed in Title I. See Shell, 996 F. 
Supp. at 370.17 Shell does not dispute this conclusion. But 
Shell contends that tertiary oil can be classified as both 
crude oil and tar sand oil, arguing that its Potter Sands oil, 
extracted through enhanced (tertiary) recovery methods, is 
also tar sand oil eligible for the Title II tax credit. Relying on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. For tax purposes, Congress divided crude oil into three tiers. See 26 
U.S.C. S 4991(c)-(e). Tier 1 oil was taxed at the highest rate, tier 3 at 
the 
lowest. See id. SS 4987(b)(1), (3). Tier 3 oil included "incremental 
tertiary 
oil," id. S 4991(e)(4), defined (with qualifications and adjustments not 
relevant here) as the difference between the amount of oil produced in a 
month from a property using a "tertiary recovery project" and the 
average monthly oil production from that property prior to passage of the 
Act, id. S 4993(a)-(b). As we understand this provision, all oil produced 
from a tertiary recovery project is tertiary oil, and any increase in 
production after the Act was passed is incremental tertiary oil. Cf. 10 
C.F.R. S 212.78(c) (1980) (defining "incremental crude oil"). Tertiary 
recovery projects are those employing "tertiary recovery methods," see 26 
U.S.C. SS 4993(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(A), which include "steam drive injection" 
and "cyclic steam injection," id. S 4993(d)(1), 10 CFR S 212.78(c) (1979). 
The District Court found, and Shell does not contest, that these are the 
procedures Shell used at Potter Sands. See Shell, 996 F. Supp. at 370 
& n.4. 
 
It is clear that all tertiary oil, and not just incremental tertiary oil, 
is 
taxable crude oil. There is no chemical distinction between incremental 
and non-incremental tertiary oil and the statute specifies no way to 
identify the incremental or non-incremental "part" of a month's 
production. Furthermore, if non-incremental tertiary oil were not crude 
oil, it would not be subject to the windfall tax, see 26 U.S.C. SS 
4986(a), 
4991(a), in which case only increases in production of tertiary oil would 
be taxed, contrary to Congress's intent to stimulate new oil production, 
see S. Rep. No. 96-394 at 27, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 437. 
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the legislative history, the District Court found that 
Congress did not consider crude oil to be tar sand oil, nor 
would Congress have imposed an excise tax and granted a 
tax credit to the same type of oil in the same statute. 
Because Shell's Potter Sands oil was indisputably crude oil 
subject to the windfall profit tax, we hold, like the District 





On this point, the legislative history is instructive. In its 
report on Title I (imposing the windfall profit tax), the 
Senate Finance Committee specified, "The term `crude oil' 
. . . applies only to natural crude petroleum and does not 
include synthetic petroleum, such as oil from shale or tar 
sands." S. Rep. No. 96-394, at 56, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 465. The Conference Committee similarly 
explained, "The term `crude oil' . . . does not apply to 
synthetic petroleum such as oil production from shale or 
tar sands." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-817, at 114 (1980), 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 642, 667. Based on this 
legislative history, the District Court concluded,"Congress 
explicitly distinguished crude oil from tar sands, and 
understood tar sands to be a crude oil substitute." Shell, 
996 F. Supp. at 370; accord Texaco, 101 T.C. at 579. 
Because Congress specified that oil extracted using 
enhanced production techniques is crude oil, oil extracted 
using enhanced production techniques cannot be tar sand 
oil, a crude oil substitute. 
 
Shell contends this legislative history should be 
interpreted in light of expert testimony that tar sand oil in 
its natural state is not synthetic oil but rather crude oil 
that can be processed into synthetic oil. But the clear 
import of the Committees' Reports is that all oil produced 
from tar sands is synthetic petroleum, not crude oil. 
Furthermore, because only crude oil is subject to the 
windfall profit tax, see 26 U.S.C. SS 4986(a), 4991(a), the 
intent behind the Committee Reports is to exempt tar sand 
oil from the tax by specifying that it is not crude oil. But 
according to Shell, the processing of tar sand oil into 
synthetic oil is generally unnecessary in the continental 
 
                                17 
  
United States.18 Shell has proposed no reason why 
Congress would exempt from the windfall profit tax the 
production of tar sand oil that is later processed into 
synthetic oil if the processing serves no useful purpose in 
important oil-producing parts of the country. Finally, it is 
worth noting that the Federal Energy Agency, in Ruling 
1976-4, spoke of tar sand oil as a "so-called synthetic fuel[ ] 
(or crude oil substitute)." 10 C.F.R. ch. II Rulings at 371. 
This language supports the view that, when COWPTA was 
enacted, tar sand oil was not generally considered to be 
crude oil, subject to the windfall profit tax. 
 
The District Court concluded that Congress did not 
regard oil capable of extraction through enhanced 
production methods as tar sand oil when COWPTA was 
enacted. We agree. The statute establishes that tertiary oil 
(oil extracted with enhanced production methods) is a type 
of crude oil, but Congress, like the FEA, did not consider 
tar sand oil to be crude oil. Therefore, tertiary oil cannot be 
tar sand oil. As the District Court explained, under Shell's 
interpretation, tertiary oil (oil produced by enhanced 
recovery methods) 
 
       would be taxed as crude oil and, therefore, excluded 
       from the category of tar sands. That same oil, however, 
       would be defined as tar sands under Section 29 
       according to Shell's definition. This would result in two 
       different definitions of tar sands under Title I and Title 
       II. Clearly, this was not the intent of Congress. 
 
Shell, 996 F. Supp. at 370-71 (footnote omitted).19 Because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Shell has represented, citing the testimony of its experts, that tar 
sand oil is refined into synthetic crude oil primarily to permit it to 
flow 
through pipelines in cold weather, and that such refining is rare in the 
continental United States because of our warmer climate. 
 
19. Similarly, the Texaco court explained that, under the definition Shell 
now advances, 
 
        [h]igh viscosity crude oil produced using secondary and enhanced 
       oil recovery methods would be characterized as crude oil (which 
       does not include oil from tar sands) for purposes of title I, while 
the 
       same high viscosity crude oil would be characterized as oil 
produced 
       from tar sands for purposes of title II. While the reference to tar 
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Shell does not contest the District Court's finding that its 
Potter Sands oil is tertiary oil, Shell's oil cannot be tar sand 




The logic and structure of the act also demonstrate that 
crude oil is not tar sand oil. If oil producible using 
enhanced recovery methods, including the oil produced at 
Potter Sands, were classified both as crude oil and as tar 
sand oil, it would be subject to the windfall profit tax and 
also eligible for the nonconventional source tax credit. The 
District Court declined to interpret the statute this way 
"[a]bsent some evidence that Congress intended such an 
anomalous result." Shell, 996 F. Supp. at 371. We agree. 
See United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 
1997) (discussing courts' "obligation to construe statutes 
sensibly and avoid constructions which yield absurd or 
unjust results"). 
 
Shell defends its interpretation by pointing out that 
under COWPTA the windfall profit tax was phased out as 
the price of oil fell whereas the nonconventional fuels credit 
was phased in under the same conditions. Shell suggests 
that the tax collected in years when oil prices were high 
was to be used to finance the subsidy when oil prices fell. 
Essentially, Shell suggests that the tax and credit together 
functioned as a rough-and-ready producer price 
stabilization scheme. But the legislative record is devoid of 
any suggestion that Congress intended such a result. 
Instead, the Senate Finance Committee explained that the 
Act "uses a large part of the revenue from the windfall profit 
tax to finance tax incentives for a wide range of alternate 
sources of energy." S. Rep. No. 96-394, at 8, reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 419. It appears Congress wanted to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       sands in defining crude oil for purposes of title I is not 
determinative 
       in defining tar sands for purposes of title II, we do not think 
that 
       Congress would have used the term "tar sands" in fundamentally 
       different ways within the same legislative enactment without 
clearly 
       expressing an intent to do so. 
 
101 T.C. at 580. 
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transfer windfall crude oil profits to producers of a distinct, 
"alternate," class of energy sources. Furthermore, Shell 
concedes that, on its reading of the statute, oil produced 
from Potter Sands would have received both a tax and a 
credit in 1981 and 1982. If Congress had sought to 
stabilize producer prices for tar sand oil, we do not see why 
Congress would have imposed a tax and provided a subsidy 
in the same year.20 Therefore, we believe the District Court 
correctly found that Congress did not intend to classify the 
same oil as both taxable crude oil and tar sand oil eligible 
for the tax credit. Since oil produced using enhanced 
recovery methods, such as Shell's, was subject to the 
windfall profit tax, it cannot have been eligible for the 




In summary, Shell's proposed definition, unlike DOE's, 
would classify oil producible through enhanced recovery 
techniques as tar sand oil. Because this classification 
would be contrary to the statutory scheme and to 
congressional intent, the District Court properly adopted 




Congress's explanation of the purpose of COWPTA 
provides further reason to reject Shell's proposed definition. 
As noted, Shell obtained crude oil from Potter Sands using 
technologies already well established in 1980. But the 
alternative fuel production credit was added by the Senate 
Finance Committee "to encourage energy conservation and 
production of alternate energy sources." S. Rep. No. 96- 
394, at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 417. "These 
alternative energy sources," the Committee explained, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. We note that Congress provided targeted subsidies to tertiary oil in 
Title I by taxing increases in tertiary production at the lower, tier 3 
rate, 
see supra n.17, and exempting altogether oil sold to finance tertiary 
extraction projects by independent producers, see 26 U.S.C. 
SS 4991(b)(4), 4994(c)(1), (c)(4)(A), (c)(4)(D); 10 C.F.R. S 212.78 
(1980); 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-817, at 93, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
646. 
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"typically involve new technologies, and some subsidy is 
needed to encourage these industries to develop to the 
stage where they can be competitive with conventional 
fuels. The information gained from the initial efforts at 
producing these energy sources will be of benefit to the 
entire economy." Id. at 87, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 496. Because continued use of a widely available means 
of crude oil production is not an "initial effort[ ]" that will 
stimulate the development of new energy technologies, we 
agree with the District Court that oil producible with 
tertiary extraction methods available in 1980, such as 
steam injection, does not qualify for the nonconventional 
source credit. See Shell, 996 F. Supp. at 367 ("[D]omestic 
crude oil would not logically be categorized as an 
alternative energy source. . . . Rather, [Congress] 
endeavored to credit the production of alternative fuels or 
so-called crude oil substitutes."); accord Texaco, 101 T.C. at 
577 ("[S]ection [29] was not intended to subsidize the 
production of crude oil but, to the contrary, was intended 
to encourage the development of crude oil substitutes."). 
 
Shell maintains the District Court imposed a "new 
technologies" requirement not found in the statute on those 
seeking the tax credit. We disagree. The energy sources 
eligible for subsidy are those specified in 26 U.S.C.A. 
S 29(c)(1). Many of those sources were defined by Congress. 
See id. S 29(c)(2)-(3); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-817, at 138-41, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 689-93; S. Rep. No. 96- 
394 at 87-88, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 496-97. So 
long as the energy produced is of one of the specified types, 
the taxpayer is eligible for the credit, whether or not the 
taxpayer used new technology. But where the definition of 
an energy source is unclear, Congress's directive that the 
eligible energy sources to be subsidized "typically involve 
new technologies" assists us in interpreting the provision. 
Congress's intent is best implemented through the DOE 
definition, which excludes energy sources produced with 
technologies already widely used or exploited when the Act 
was passed. 
 




In this case, as the District Court noted, "[t]he definition 
of `tar sands' contained in the [DOE] Ruling is completely 
congruous with Congress' intent to both encourage the 
development of new technologies and limit the Section 29 
credit to crude oil substitutes that could not be obtained 
using conventional methods." Shell, 996 F. Supp. at 367. 
Shell points out that the DOE Ruling was issued in 
response to "inquiries with respect to the applicability of 
the [EPAA price and supply controls] to the so-called 
synthetic fuels (or crude oil substitutes) processed from . . . 
tar sands . . . and other natural deposits that must be 
mined before the crude oil substitute can be extracted." 
DOE Ruling 1976-4, 10 C.F.R. ch. II Rulings at 371. Shell 
interprets this language to mean that FEA had received 
inquiries involving only tar sand oil that was both extracted 
from mined tar sand and processed into synthetic crude oil. 
Shell argues that FEA adopted an artificially narrow 
definition of "tar sands" in order to ensure that its Ruling 
would exclude only such oil from EPAA regulation. We are 
not convinced. It seems unlikely that FEA would have 
knowingly propounded an inaccurate definition, even for a 
limited purpose, rather than simply specifying that its 
Ruling applied only to tar sand oil that is extracted from 
mined tar sand and processed into synthetic crude oil. We 
note that the Ruling's definition does not limit tar sands oil 
to oil extracted from tar sands after mining. Therefore we 
agree with the District Court in adopting the DOE Ruling's 
definition of tar sands for purposes of the nonconventional 
fuels tax credit.21 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Shell also argues that Ruling 1976-4 is too obscure to be relied on 
in defining "oil produced from tar sands." But the statute adopted 
certain definitions contained in the EPAA regulations, such as "stripper 
well," "newly discovered oil," "qualified tertiary recovery project," 
"tertiary 
recovery method," "tertiary incentive revenue," "allowed expenses" (in 
certain contexts), "front-end oil," "front-end tertiary project," and 
"crude 
oil", see 26 U.S.C. SS 4991(d)(1)(A), (e)(2), 4993(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(A), 
4994(c)(2)(C), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4)(B), (c)(4)(D), 4996(b)(1), (b)(8) and 
also 
specified that the "base level" used in defining incremental tertiary oil 
is 
to be "determined under rules similar to" EPAA regulations, see id. 
S 4993(b)(1). In its report on the bill, the Senate Finance Committee 
wrote, "Reference to the energy regulations also would be important 
when the Secretary or producers must make determinations by analogy 
 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
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to the energy regulations, e.g., computing the base level for a tertiary 
project," S. Rep. No. 96-394 at 57, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
466-67, and endorsed administrative interpretations of the regulations, 
see id., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 467. We give due regard to 
Ruling 1976-4, a DOE interpretation of the EPAA regulations, in 
applying 26 U.S.C. S 29. 
 
                                23 
